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[We fear that] this case will become another Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce, with the participants “mistily engaged in one
of the ten thousand stages of an endless cause, tripping
one another up on slippery precedents, groping kneedeep in technicalities, running their . . . heads against
walls of words, and making a pretence of equity . . . .”
—The Sixth Circuit, bemoaning the procedural complexities
facing federal takings litigants1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1985 case Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,2 the Supreme
Court articulated the requirement that in order to challenge a
putative regulatory taking by a state or local entity under the
Fifth Amendment in federal court, a claimant must first seek
compensation in state court.3 Twenty years later, in San Remo
Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,4 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that, because of issue-preclusion principles,
the Williamson County requirement could exile a large proportion
of Fifth Amendment takings plaintiffs from federal court.5
This line of precedent opened a Pandora’s box of unforeseen
complications, spawning many more questions than it purported to
answer. Perhaps most important is what kind of requirement the
rule actually is. I contend that a faithful reading of Williamson
County as originally reasoned—instituting a rule of “ripeness”
grounded in the Constitution—runs the risk of inflicting
considerable (and unintentional) harm on litigants and the judicial
system alike.
The rule, therefore, ought to be reconceptualized as a matter of
merely “prudential” ripeness. In fact, the Supreme Court has
taken a few steps in this direction, but its remarks on the matter
1 Kruse v. Vill. of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting CHARLES
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (Oxford University Press 1989) (1853)).
2 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
3 Id. at 195.
4 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
5 Id. at 346.
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have been largely conclusory. This Article seeks to supply a
rationale for justifying that maneuver.
Part II provides background, summarizing the Williamson
County and San Remo Hotel opinions. Part III outlines the
emergence of the principal question explored here—whether
Williamson County’s ripeness requirement derives from the
Constitution itself or, instead, from mere prudential
considerations—and examines the answers tendered by previous
observers. Although a handful of courts and commentators have
considered (or offered cursory comments on) this question, this
Article is intended to do so in a comparatively comprehensive
manner.
In order to offer a solution to this puzzle, I attempt in Part IV to
demonstrate the superiority of a prudential reading of Williamson
County with respect to four ongoing areas of uncertainty: (1)
whether so-called “facial” Fifth Amendment takings claims are
subject to the rule, (2) whether diversity and supplemental
jurisdiction are available in federal court for prerequisite state
causes of action, (3) whether litigants attempting to raise Fifth
Amendment takings claims in state courts must satisfy the
requirement, and (4) how claim preclusion could operate in this
context, particularly in state courts.
Because prudential
justiciability rules, among other features, are amenable to
exceptions where the policy rationales that they were intended to
promote are not implicated or where countervailing concerns
predominate, viewing the compensation prong in this light permits
a comparison of competing considerations in the context of specific
cases and, ultimately, allows courts to avoid some of the most
surprising and senseless potential implications of alternative
understandings.
II. THE PIECES
This Part retraces the weaving of what any scholar of federal
jurisdiction would recognize as a very tangled web. The Supreme
Court first addressed the “ripeness” of Fifth Amendment
regulatory-takings claims over twenty-five years ago in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
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Bank of Johnson City,6 discussed in Part II.A. In 2005, the Court
answered a single follow-up question in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City and County of San Francisco,7 addressed in Part II.B. Since
then, the Court has largely left lower tribunals and academics to
undertake the task of sifting through the intricacies and
implications of those two brief but important forays into the field.
A. WILLIAMSON COUNTY

Voting seven to one, the Justices may have considered
Williamson County a relatively simple case.8 Time, however,
would demonstrate that it was anything but.
The facts are fairly straightforward. A bank seeking to develop
a swath of land into a subdivision alleged that the enforcement of
various county zoning provisions constituted a regulatory taking
under the Fifth Amendment.9 The bank sued in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 Although the lower courts reached the
merits, ultimately ruling in the bank’s favor, the Supreme Court—
with Justice Blackmun writing for the majority—held that the
claim was not ripe for adjudication.11
The Court outlined two bases for that conclusion. First, “a
claim that the application of government regulations effects a
taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue.”12 Here, although the county had denied the
bank’s development plan, the bank had not availed itself of further
opportunities for administrative review. Specifically, the bank had
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
545 U.S. 323 (2005).
8 Justice White dissented without opinion. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
473 U.S. at 200. Indeed, the Court chose to dispose of the case on the ripeness grounds
discussed anon rather than to answer directly the question on which it had granted
certiorari: whether the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause—as opposed to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses—is the appropriate vehicle for challenging
temporary regulatory takings. Id. at 185. The Court apparently found this question so
difficult that it had left it undecided twice before and chose to do so again here. Id. (citing
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
9 Id. at 175.
10 Id. at 182.
11 Id. at 182, 200.
12 Id. at 186.
6
7
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failed to seek individualized variances from the generally
applicable zoning ordinances under which its plan was blocked.13
Although the hook for that holding was apparently the textual
principle that the government cannot commit a “taking” before
reaching a final decision on the disposition of property, the Court
explained its reasoning primarily in terms of its own precedent.
Prior cases indicated that two of the most important factors for
determining whether a taking has occurred are “the economic
impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”14
Neither of those factors, the Court explained, can be adequately
evaluated until the administrative body in question has arrived at
a “final, definitive position” concerning the application of the
relevant regulations to the challenger’s property.15 I refer to this
requirement as the Williamson County “takings” prong or
requirement.16
The second reason that the claim was unripe, the Supreme Court
explained, was that the bank had not sought compensation through
the procedures provided by the state. “The Fifth Amendment does
not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without
just compensation,” the Court stated.17 And compensation need not
be tendered before or at the time of the taking, the Court concluded:
“[A]ll that is required is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation’ exist.”18 This Article calls the
Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 191 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).
15 Id.
16 The bank protested that requiring it to pursue administrative process flouted the
holding of Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that § 1983 plaintiffs need
not exhaust state administrative remedies before securing their day in federal court.
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192. The Court responded by drawing a (perhaps arguable)
distinction between finality and exhaustion: “the finality requirement is concerned with
whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury,” whereas “the exhaustion requirement generally refers to
administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an
adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise
inappropriate.” Id. at 193.
17 Id. at 194.
18 Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124–25 (1974) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The string of precedent on which the Court
relied also included Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016; Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.,
309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); and Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932).
13
14
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requirement that challengers pursue such procedures the
Williamson County “compensation” prong or requirement.
The Court grounded the compensation requirement in the text
of the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing that “no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.”19 The
requirement was said to flow ineluctably from the very “nature of
the constitutional right.”20 Unlike the takings prong, however, the
Court made clear that the compensation prong extends past the
state administrative scheme, requiring an individual alleging a
regulatory taking to seek payment before the state judiciary—at
least, if that is where any pertinent procedural mechanisms are
located, as is generally the case. Thus, in Williamson County, the
Court rested its conclusion that the plaintiff’s claim was unripe on
the fact that Tennessee law provided an inverse-condemnation
cause of action that the bank had not pursued.21
Williamson County’s takings prong has met little resistance in
lower courts or the academy. But the same cannot be said for the
perennially controversial and confusing compensation prong.22
B. SAN REMO HOTEL

Following Williamson County, the Supreme Court largely
avoided disputes over the ripeness of Fifth Amendment takings
claims for twenty years. It returned to the topic in 2005 with San
Remo Hotel,23 which addressed whether federal courts could craft
an exception to the so-called “Full Faith and Credit Statute,” 28
U.S.C. § 1738,24 for issues that Williamson County caused to be

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (emphasis added).
Id.
21 Id. at 196–97 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-123 (1980)).
22 It may be worth specifying at the outset that although Williamson County’s
compensation prong has been subject to sustained and often withering criticism—for recent
examples, see, e.g., Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to
Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014); J. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings
Review? The Courts’ “Prudential” Answer to Williamson County’s Flawed State Litigation
Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV. 319 (2014); Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of
the End? Horne v. Department of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245—this Article remains agnostic about whether the Supreme Court
ought to overrule it and assumes that the doctrine is here to stay.
23 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
24 “[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
19
20
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decided in state court—such that regulatory-takings plaintiffs
would be assured an opportunity for review before the federal
bench.25 The Court answered in the negative.26
The facts and procedural history of San Remo Hotel are fairly
complex, making a somewhat detailed sketch helpful. In the late
1970s, San Francisco sought to combat a shortage of affordable
housing by heavily regulating the conversion of “residential” hotel
units to “tourist” units.27 In order to commence such conversions,
hotel owners were required to build new residential units,
rehabilitate old ones, or pay “in lieu” fees. To facilitate the
scheme, each hotel was required to report the number of
residential and tourist units that it operated.28 At the time, the
San Remo Hotel operated as a bed and breakfast, but its
management erroneously reported that it was entirely
residential.29 When the mistake came to light many years later,
the hotel was required to apply for a conversion permit.30 The city
agreed to issue the permit, but only on the condition that the
owners pay a $567,000 in-lieu fee.31
The hotel owners filed suit under § 1983 in federal district
court, asserting facial and as-applied regulatory-takings claims,
among others.32 The district court dismissed both, holding the
facial claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations and
the as-applied claims unripe under Williamson County because the
hotel owners had not pursued an inverse-condemnation suit in
state court.33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the asapplied claims.34 As for the facial claims, the plaintiffs took the
unusual step of urging the court to apply “Pullman abstention” to
allow the parties to litigate a potentially dispositive state statutory
question (concerning the propriety of the city’s initial classification
of the hotel as residential) in state court.35 The court agreed,
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327.
Id.
27 Id. at 328.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 328–29.
30 Id. at 328.
31 Id. at 329.
32 Id. at 330.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 331.
35 Id. at 330. This sort of abstention was initially articulated in Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
25
26
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though it noted that its decision to abstain had nothing to do with
ripeness, stating that the main facial claim was “ ‘ripe the instant
the [challenged regulation] was enacted.’ ”36 The Ninth Circuit
instructed the plaintiffs that if they “wanted to ‘retain [their] right
to return to federal court for adjudication of [their] federal claim,
[they] must make an appropriate reservation in state court,’ ”37
referring to the procedural device known as an “England
reservation.”38
In state court, the hotel owners pursued the state statutory
question, but they also raised broad takings claims under the
California constitution while purporting to reserve their Fifth
Amendment claims.39 Despite acknowledging the reservation, the
California Supreme Court observed that the takings provisions of
the state and federal constitutions were “ ‘construed . . .
congruently’ ” and then analyzed the state claims under Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, ruling in favor of the city.40 The hotel
owners then returned to federal district court, seeking to revive
and amend the complaint from which the Ninth Circuit had
abstained.41 The district court held that their claims were barred
not only by the statute of limitations but also by the doctrine of
issue preclusion embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Statute,
under which federal courts must accord dispositive effect to state
judgments that would be preclusive in the courts of the judgmentrendering state.42 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.43
The Supreme Court—with Justice Stevens writing for the
majority—began its analysis by expounding the importance of the
principles encoded in the Full Faith and Credit Statute,
characterizing preclusion doctrine as critical to “ ‘the very object
for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the
peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of
judicial determination.’ ”44 Unsurprisingly, the Court proceeded to
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 330–31 (quoting 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 331 (quoting 145 F.3d at 1106 n.7) (alterations in original).
38 Id. at 331 n.6.
This strategy for softening the effects of Pullman abstention was
originally noted in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420–21
(1964).
39 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 331–34.
40 Id. at 332, 334 (quoting 41 P.3d 87, 100–01 (Cal. 2002)).
41 Id. at 334.
42 Id. at 334–35.
43 Id. at 335.
44 Id. at 337 (quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897)).
36
37
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reject the hotel owners’ entreaty for an exception where Fifth
Amendment takings plaintiffs must start in state court by virtue
of Williamson County, even where they seek to preserve federal
claims under England.45 The essence of the argument was that
absent such an exception, issue preclusion would very often bar
federal courts from hearing takings claims, thereby denying a
federal forum for the vindication of a federal right.46
With regard to England, the Court explained that “[t]he
purpose of [Pullman] abstention is not to afford state courts an
opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to
the federal question,” but rather “to avoid resolving the federal
question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot
the federal controversy.”47 Thus, because they chose to submit to
the California courts state constitutional claims in addition to the
statutory issue that had caused the Ninth Circuit to abstain, the
plaintiffs could not claim the benefits of England for purposes of
Moreover, England
their facial Fifth Amendment claims.48
provided even weaker support for federal-court adjudication of the
plaintiffs’ as-applied claims, the Court explained. Because the
federal courts never possessed jurisdiction over those claims in the
first place under Williamson County (and the Ninth Circuit
therefore dismissed rather than abstained from them), “there was
no reason to expect that they could be relitigated in full if
advanced in the state proceedings.”49
The Court explicitly rebuffed the policy argument that “ ‘[i]t
would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the
Supreme Court required [plaintiffs] to follow before bringing a
Fifth Amendment takings claim . . . also precluded [them] from
ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim’ ” in federal
court.50 The Court denied that plaintiffs have an absolute right to
vindicate federal claims in federal forums;51 scoffed at the

Id. at 338.
Id.
47 Id. at 339.
48 See id. at 341 (“[P]etitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the same
federal issues they asked it to reserve. England does not support . . . any such right.”).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 342 (alterations in original).
51 The Court asserted that inter-system-preclusion precedent had repeatedly rejected
that assumption even as to litigants who are forced to air their claims first in state court.
See id. (citing, inter alia, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1980) (holding plaintiff
45
46
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suggestion that “courts may simply create exceptions to . . . § 1738
wherever courts deem them appropriate,” even for arguably
“laudable policy goal[s]”;52 and noted the irony that the hotel
owners were never required to ripen their facial claims in state
court in the first place but voluntarily requested abstention.53
In closing, the Court briefly commended the federalism virtues
furthered by Williamson County. The whole of the statement on
the subject was that “[s]tate courts are fully competent to
adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions.
Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than
federal courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and
legal questions relating to zoning and land-use regulations.” 54
III. THE PUZZLE
A. PARAMETERS OF THE INQUIRY

In one of his last opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the judgment of San Remo Hotel.55 He wrote separately to state
that Williamson County’s compensation prong “may have been
mistaken” and should be reconsidered, despite his having joined
the majority in that decision.56 Specifically, he stated:
It is not clear to me that Williamson County was
correct in demanding that, once a government entity
has reached a final decision with respect to a
claimant’s property, the claimant must seek
compensation in state court before bringing a federal
takings claim in federal court.
The Court in
Williamson County purported to interpret the Fifth
Amendment
in
divining
this
state-litigation
requirement. See, e.g., 473 U.S. at 194 (referencing
precluded from raising Fourth Amendment challenge in federal court under § 1983 where
state court had previously rejected same claim in exclusionary-rule context)).
52 Id. at 344. Rather, “Congress must clearly manifest its intent to depart from § 1738”
via “an express or implied partial repeal” in a later-enacted statute. Id. at 344–45 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
53 Id. at 345 (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)).
54 Id. at 347.
55 Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas, JJ.).
56 Id. O’Connor’s joining the concurrence also represented a reversal of course.
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“[t]he nature of the constitutional right”).
More
recently, we have referred to it as merely a prudential
requirement. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997).57
Ultimately, Rehnquist concluded, “[i]t is not obvious that either
constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize
all state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal
takings claim.”58
Rehnquist’s separate opinion brought to light an important
question: what, precisely, are the underpinnings of Williamson
County’s compensation prong? Does the Constitution actually
command the rule, as intimated by Williamson County itself? Or
is it better characterized as grounded in judicial conceptions of
sound federalism policy? And why does it matter? That, in a
nutshell, is the puzzle to which I hope to offer a solution.
The remainder of this Part fleshes out the puzzle’s parameters.
Part III.B.1 outlines the doctrine of ripeness in its constitutional
and prudential forms as pertinent to the takings context. Part
III.B.2 follows with a descriptive overview of relevant
jurisprudence and commentary. Of particular importance, the
Supreme Court has recently spoken to this long-simmering debate,
but it has purported to solve only a portion of the puzzle and
provided nary a word of explanation about why or how it arrived
at that solution.
This Article ultimately argues that it would be wise to classify
the compensation requirement as prudential rather than
constitutional. Recognizing a prudential solution to the ripeness
puzzle both offers an analytical tool for beginning to break the
impasse on a number of difficult doctrinal questions and provides
the most—sometimes perhaps the only—sensible answers.
Id. at 349 (citations shortened).
Id. As for the possibility that Williamson County’s compensation prong is justified by
prudential principles, Rehnquist contended that the case simply had not been convincingly
made—and that he doubted it could, given the costs to litigants of fulfilling the
requirement. Id. at 350–52. Rehnquist pointed out that the majority’s statement that state
courts are competent and experienced in adjudicating land-use issues does not distinguish
takings claims from other constitutional challenges relating to land-use law—say, in the
First Amendment context. Id. at 350–51 (citing, inter alia, Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (holding that localities may prohibit adult theaters through
content-neutral zoning regulations)). Rehnquist thus asked why “federal takings claims in
particular should be singled out to be confined to state court.” Id. at 351.
57
58
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B. THREE SHADES OF RIPENESS

1. In Theory. Justiciability rules determine what matters are
appropriate for decision in courts of law—as opposed to, perhaps,
the political branches.59 Justiciability encompasses the politicalquestion and advisory-opinion doctrines, as well as standing,
ripeness, and mootness.60 Ripeness, generally stated, is the rule
that the injury of which a plaintiff complains cannot be overly
speculative.61 Thus, the central concern is whether the case
involves uncertain or “ ‘contingent future events that may not occur
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ”62 To the extent that
the doctrines are actually separable, whereas standing asks
whether the party before the court has suffered a judicially
cognizable injury and mootness asks whether the dispute remains
live, “ripeness asks whether there yet is any need for the court to
act.”63
Some justiciability principles, the Supreme Court has made
clear, derive from Article III’s limitation of the federal judicial
power to “Cases” and “Controversies.”64 Those are traditionally
known as “constitutional” justiciability doctrines. Others, in
contrast, derive from the judiciary’s own notions of “prudent
judicial administration”—that is, where “wise policy militates
against judicial review,”65 generally because certain cases “are
more appropriately resolved in another forum.”66 Those are
“prudential” justiciability doctrines. The Supreme Court has
described ripeness requirements in both constitutional and
prudential terms depending on the context,67 and the Second

59 See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457,
1481–84 (2006).
60 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.1 (5th ed. 2007).
61 See id. § 2.4.1.
62 Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990) (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (2d ed. 1984)).
63 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 3532.1.
64 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 2.1.
65 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 2.1.
66 Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate over Federal
Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 n.7 (1999).
67 For examples of the Court invoking ripeness in Article III terms, see Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974), and Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433 (1975). For
examples of the Court describing ripeness as a merely prudential requirement, see StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010).
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Circuit has offered the following helpful overview of the distinction
between the two:
Constitutional ripeness is a doctrine that, like
standing, is a limitation on the power of the judiciary.
It prevents courts from declaring the meaning of the
law in a vacuum and from constructing generalized
legal rules unless the resolution of an actual dispute
requires it. But when a court declares that a case is
not prudentially ripe, it means that the case will be
better decided later and that the parties will not have
constitutional rights undermined by the delay. It does
not mean that the case is not a real or concrete dispute
affecting cognizable current concerns of the parties
within the meaning of Article III. . . . Prudential
ripeness is, then, a tool that courts may use to enhance
the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming
embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to
be unnecessary or may require premature examination
of, especially, constitutional issues that time may
make easier or less controversial.68
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has quite recently thrown
some quantity of cold water on the propriety of prudential ripeness
(and, indeed, all prudential justiciability doctrines). In particular,
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus69 presented, among other
issues, a prudential-ripeness question. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Thomas’s opinion stated that “[t]o the extent
respondents would have us deem petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable
on grounds that are ‘prudential,’ rather than constitutional,’ ‘[t]hat
request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the
principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases
within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually unflagging.’ ”70 But the Court
concluded that it “need not resolve the continuing vitality of the
prudential ripeness doctrine” because immediate adjudication was

Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
70 Id. at 2347 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1386 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68
69
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obviously appropriate in that case.71 Whether the Court will
continue down that path remains to be seen, but this Article
assumes the doctrine’s continued survival.
Some observers have posited that the compensation
requirement may be more sui generis than the conventional
dichotomy between constitutional and prudential ripeness rules
suggests. In particular, Professor Gene Nichol makes a compelling
argument that Williamson County invoked ripeness in a different
sort of constitutional way—based not on Article III (which he
argues should never form the basis of ripeness doctrines72) but on
the Fifth Amendment itself.73 As such,
ripeness doctrine [is] . . . used to measure the demands
of substantive . . . constitutional causes of action. This
application of the doctrine does not relate to
jurisdictional power at all. Instead, it is an aspect of
actionability analysis—that is, the determination of
whether the litigant has stated a claim on which relief
can be granted.74
Accordingly, Nichol contends that Williamson County’s “ripeness”
requirements are actually merits-level prerequisites for stating a
Fifth Amendment takings claim: they are “elements” of the cause
of action.75
Key to this framing of Williamson County is the opinion’s
fundamentally textual analysis. As Justice Blackmun explained:
“[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just
compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied. The nature of the constitutional

Id.
See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156
(1987) (“I argue that a marriage of ripeness and article III is flawed. Not only is it
inconsistent with the Court’s depiction of the case or controversy requirement, it is a wrong
turn analytically—both for ripeness and for article III.”); accord Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 608–
10 (1992) (similar argument focusing on mootness).
73 Nichol, supra note 72, at 162, 164–70.
74 Id. at 162.
75 Id. at 176.
71
72
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right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures
for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.”76
All in all, therefore, there are two different ways in which
Williamson County’s compensation prong can be understood as
encoding a constitutional requirement—traditionally, as a
component of the case-or-controversy constraint (what one might
call “Article-III-based” ripeness), or idiosyncratically, as an
elemental ingredient of what it takes to inflict injury under the
text of the Takings Clause (what one might call “FifthAmendment-based” ripeness).
To the extent that the
compensation prong represents constitutional ripeness concerns
whatsoever, Nichol quite likely has the better of the argument
given the emphasis that Williamson County placed on the text of
the Fifth Amendment.
2. As Applied. Williamson County did not describe its justcompensation requirement as prudential in any way; rather, the
Court’s reasoning was rooted in the Constitution through and
through. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his San Remo Hotel
concurrence, however, the rationale behind the rule has become
the subject of significant ambiguity over time.77
Rehnquist cited Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, in
which the Court noted that “[t]he [government] does not question
that [the plaintiff] properly presents a genuine ‘case or
controversy’ sufficient to satisfy Article III” and then explicitly
labeled the Williamson County requirements “two independent
prudential hurdles to a regulatory-takings claim brought against a
state entity in federal court.”78 The Court did not, however,
explain why the doctrine was abruptly deemed prudential or what
policies it might advance.
Although Rehnquist did not cite it, others have noted that
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council79 framed Williamson
County in prudential terms as well.80 There, Justice Scalia wrote
the following for the majority:

76 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 194 n.13 (1985).
77 545 U.S. 323, 349 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
78 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 & n.7 (1997).
79 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
80 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated,
638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential
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[Petitioner] has properly alleged Article III injury in
fact in this case . . . . That there is a discretionary
“special permit” procedure by which he may regain—
for the future, at least—beneficial use of his land goes
only to the prudential “ripeness” of [his] challenge, and
for the reasons discussed we do not think it prudent to
apply that prudential requirement here.81
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that Williamson County’s
ripeness requirements—of which he was the original architect—are
“not simply a gesture of good will to land-use planners.”82 Rather,
“[i]n the absence of ‘a final and authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property’ and the utilization of state procedures for just
compensation, there is no final judgment, and in the absence of a
final judgment there is no jurisdiction.”83 “This rule,” Blackmun
continued, quoting Williamson County, “is ‘compelled by the very
nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause.’ ”84
And, he concluded, the rule (specifically, the takings prong) had not
been satisfied in the case at bar.85
Although at least one lower-court opinion read the majority’s
statement in Lucas as definitively resolving the Williamson
County ripeness puzzle,86 Scalia’s remark has not been interpreted
that way by many observers. Nor was it viewed that way by the
Supreme Court itself, as Rehnquist’s San Remo Hotel concurrence
made clear by criticizing the majority for “conspicuously leav[ing]
open” the question whether Williamson County’s compensation
prong “is merely a prudential rule, and not a constitutional
mandate.”87
Theory for Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
445, 468 (2001).
81 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012–13.
82 Id. at 1041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986))
(other citations omitted).
84 Id. (quoting 473 U.S. 172, 190 (1985)).
85 Id. at 1041–43.
86 See Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [Supreme]
Court has explicitly held that the Williamson requirements are merely prudential
requirements.”). Although that decision was vacated, see 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), the replacement opinion resolved the issue in the same way by combining Suitum
and circuit precedent, see id. at 1117.
87 See 545 U.S. 323, 352 n.2 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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To be specific, although relatively few academics devoted
significant attention to the particular source of the compensation
requirement, suppositions in the years following Lucas were
decidedly mixed. “It is unclear whether the Williamson County
[compensation] prong is a constitutional or prudential
requirement,” one author noted, citing San Remo Hotel.88
“[A]lthough ripeness decisions are often based on prudential
considerations, the Court in Williamson County held that the
[compensation] requirement is based on the text of Article III and
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,” declared another
author (pre-San Remo Hotel), despite citing Suitum and Lucas.89
Nevertheless, even before the Supreme Court’s most recent
comments on the issue, the tide may have turned toward viewing
the compensation prong as a prudential rule. One commentator, for
example, contended that “there are several prudential issues
wrapped up in the concern for ripeness that better explain the
results” of Williamson County.90 And a set of scholars similarly
distinguished between “jurisdictional content,” apparently referring
to Article III principles, and “takings-ripeness doctrine,” arguing
that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . . refused” to mix the
two.91 Professor Stewart Sterk, for his part, accurately described
the Court’s jurisprudential arc, stating that whereas “[t]he
Williamson County opinion itself justified [the compensation]
requirement primarily in formal [constitutional] terms,” San Remo
Hotel “added a prudential justification.”92

88 See Scott A. Keller, Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness:
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings
Claims, 85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 209 (2006) (ultimately arguing that Williamson County does
not concern ripeness at all but instead constitutes “judicial jurisdiction stripping”).
89 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The
Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9 (1999).
90 Eric A. Lindberg, Comment, Multijurisdictionality and Federalism: Assessing San
Remo Hotel’s Effect on Regulatory Takings, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1859–60 (2010).
91 Martinez & Martinez, supra note 80, at 467.
92 Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
251, 284–85 (2006). Another thoroughgoing article presented a systematic argument for
why the compensation prong should not be characterized as an Article-III-based rule. See
Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 66, at 25–35. But because the article characterized the rule
as articulating both a prudential preference and a Fifth-Amendment-based rule, see id.
(calling the requirement both “a rule of prudence” and “an element of a cause of action”), it
managed to avoid what amounts to an important distinction here.
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In any event, the Supreme Court, again speaking through
Justice Scalia, purported to solve a portion of the puzzle in the
2010 case Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection.93 The questions before
the Court were whether and, if so, under what standard judicial
action can violate the Takings Clause. A plurality concluded that
the judiciary can indeed effect an unconstitutional taking if it
“declares that what was once an established right of private
property no longer exists.”94 Then, turning to the case at bar, a
portion of the opinion joined by all eight of the participating
Justices noted that “respondents raise [a] preliminary point[ ]
which need not detain us long.”95 Specifically, “[t]he city and the
county [respondents] argue . . . that the claim is unripe because
petitioner has not sought just compensation”—a Williamson
County compensation-prong argument.96 The Court declared that
because “[n]either [this] objection [nor another] appeared in the
briefs in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari, and since
neither is jurisdictional, we deem both waived.”97 Ultimately, the
unanimous Court held that no taking had occurred.98
As an initial matter, it bears noting that the Court’s declaration
that the compensation prong is non-jurisdictional appears to have
ended a long-simmering debate about whether defendants can
eschew the compensation prong’s dictate to plaintiffs. Some
commentators had encouraged courts to permit defendants to
waive or forfeit the requirement in certain situations, thereby
allowing Fifth Amendment takings claims to be heard in federal
court in the first instance.99 And some courts had done exactly
that, especially in cases that had been removed from state
systems.100 In particular, some observers suggested that City of

560 U.S. 702 (2010).
Id. at 715 (plurality opinion).
95 Id. at 729 (majority opinion).
96 Id.
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 See id. at 729–33 (concluding that Florida law did not recognize petitioner’s claimed
property interest).
99 See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1871.
100 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated,
638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp.
2d 1218, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d sub nom. McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219,
1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (assuming ripeness without deciding). But see, e.g., Anderson v.
93
94
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Chicago v. International College of Surgeons101 had endorsed this
practice.102 There, a local-government defendant removed to
federal court a suit presenting a hodge-podge of state and federal
challenges, including both facial and as-applied Fifth Amendment
takings claims, arising out of the denial of construction permits for
the conversion of a historical landmark to high-rise
condominiums.103 The Supreme Court upheld removal without
once mentioning Williamson County (apparently echoing the
silence of the parties on the issue104), instead focusing on whether
the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
state administrative claims was proper.105
Of course, to the extent that any given ripeness rule represents
a jurisdictional requirement, a federal court must dismiss claims
that the rule renders underdeveloped, including those removed
from state court.106 It is for this reason, apparently assuming that
the compensation prong was meant to be jurisdictional, that one
commentator declared that “Williamson County and City of
Chicago are in direct conflict” and that “[e]ither City of Chicago
erroneously permitted removal, or [it] implicitly held that the
regulatory takings claim was ripe—a sub silentio elimination of
the Williamson County [compensation] prong.”107 Stop the Beach
put an end to this debate by declaring the compensation prong
non-jurisdictional and expressly endorsing the possibility of waiver
or forfeiture.108

Chamberlain, 134 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The only exception to this doctrine
is futility [of seeking state-court relief].”).
101 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
102 See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1871 n.322.
103 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 159–60.
104 See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here:
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches Self-Parody
Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 677 & n.26 (2004) (“In fairness to the Court, it appears that the
briefs . . . did not call Williamson County to the Court’s attention.”).
105 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163 (ruling affirmatively).
106 See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722
(4th ed. 2009) (“It also is well-settled that the federal right or immunity alleged by the state
court plaintiff and argued to provide the basis for removal of the case must be the subject of
a genuine and present controversy between the parties, not merely a possible or conjectural
one.”).
107 Keller, supra note 88, at 220.
108 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010). For an excellent recent discussion of the interaction between
Williamson County and removal doctrine, see Breemer, supra note 22, at 332–38.
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Stop the Beach, however, provided neither an explanation nor a
relevant citation for why the compensation prong was deemed nonjurisdictional.109 In attempting to elucidate an answer, we must be
careful first to understand precisely what Stop the Beach said with
respect to the source of the rule. That is, what did the Court mean
by declaring the compensation prong non-jurisdictional?
As outlined above, there are three possible solutions to the
Williamson County ripeness puzzle: the compensation prong could
be an Article-III-based constitutional rule, a Fifth-Amendmentbased constitutional rule, or a merely prudential rule. In a
footnote, Stop the Beach made clear that it was the first of these
possibilities that it intended to reject. Specifically, Justice Scalia
stated that “the claim here is ripe insofar as Article III standing is
concerned, since (accepting petitioner’s version of Florida law as
true) petitioner has been deprived of property.”110 Nor would a
requirement based on either of the remaining possible foundations
for the compensation prong naturally be described as
“jurisdictional.”
A Fifth-Amendment-based rule goes to the
substantive merits of a takings cause of action (and is thus part
and parcel of “actionability analysis”),111 and a prudential rule
arises from the judiciary’s own notions of wise policy rather than
external limitations on its adjudicatory power.112 Accordingly,
whereas some observers view Stop the Beach as having declared
the compensation requirement definitively prudential,113 the
matter does not appear to be quite so clear-cut: the Court’s remark
109 The only citations referred to the principle that non-jurisdictional objections are
susceptible of waiver in the Supreme Court if not presented in a respondent’s opposition to
a petition for certiorari. See id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 15; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 815–16 (1985)).
110 Id. at 729 n.10.
111 See Nichol, supra note 72, at 162; see also supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
Nichol expressly notes that a Fifth-Amendment-based compensation requirement would be
non-jurisdictional. Nichol, supra note 72, at 162 (“This application of the [ripeness] doctrine
does not relate to jurisdictional power at all.”).
112 See supra text accompanying note 68.
113 See Breemer, supra note 22, at 342 (characterizing Stop the Beach as “holding that the
[compensation prong] is a prudential rule”); Ian Fein, Note, Why Judicial Takings Are Unripe,
38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749, 774 (2011) (“Over the years, there has been some uncertainty about the
prudential or constitutional nature of the Williamson County ripeness rules. The Court
provided a definitive answer in Stop the Beach when all eight Justices agreed that the
[compensation prong] was not jurisdictional . . . . The unanimous prudential declaration is
significant . . . .”). Fein later notes the possibility that the compensation prong may derive
from the Fifth Amendment’s text but proceeds to reject it on the basis of the same assumption
that Stop the Beach declared the requirement definitively prudential. See id. at 784.
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could be consistent with a Fifth-Amendment-based understanding
as well.
The Court followed with a similar statement in the 2013 case
Horne v. Department of Agriculture.114 The question there was
whether raisin handlers whose crop was significantly burdened by
a federal marketing order were permitted to raise a takings claim
as an affirmative defense to an enforcement action under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).115
Invoking Williamson County, the government argued that the
handlers were instead required to wait until the conclusion of the
enforcement action and then pursue relief in the Court of Federal
Claims.116 The Supreme Court stated that “[a]lthough we often
refer to this consideration as prudential ‘ripeness,’ we have
recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional.”117 For
that proposition, the Court cited Stop the Beach and, just as there,
included a footnote referring to the case-or-controversy
requirement118—thus demonstrating that it was, again, the
Article-III-based conception of the compensation prong that it
meant to reject (albeit this time with a noncommittal nod toward a
prudential underpinning as well).
In
light
of
Horne’s
subsequent
conclusion
that
“[p]etitioners . . . have no alternative remedy” in the Court of
Federal Claims (owing to the interaction between the Tucker Act
and the AMAA), such that Williamson County posed no obstacle,119
the statement about the character of that case’s ripeness
requirements was arguably dictum.120 But it also bears noting
that the Court proceeded to declare that “it would make little
sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and
then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in
another proceeding”121—a remarkable statement in light of the fact
that Williamson County requires a similar sort of piecemeal
process. Although Horne did not note the relevance of Williamson
County to this point, it is difficult to see how the Court’s conclusion
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013).
Id. at 2061.
Id.
Id. at 2062 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2062 & n.6.
Id. at 2063.
See id.
Id. at 2063.
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could square with anything other than a prudential understanding
of the compensation prong (such that it would not apply to, at
least, some claims against the federal government). Indeed, some
scholars have read the case in that manner.122 Again, however,
that inference is fairly opaque, and the Court’s treatment of the
issue was quite conclusory.
To sum up, following many years of confusion and some debate,
the Supreme Court has recently stated that Williamson County’s
compensation requirement should not be conceptualized as a
ripeness rule grounded in Article III. Instead, the Court has
suggested, the rule should be viewed as a purely prudential
mandate.123 But in making those moves, the Court has mostly
failed to explain why prudential considerations supply a better
solution to the ripeness puzzle than does Article III—not to
mention the text of the Fifth Amendment. The remainder of this
Article offers some considerations for attempting to fill that gap.
IV. THE SOLUTION
Williamson County and San Remo Hotel opened a Pandora’s box
of unforeseen complications, spawning many more questions than
they purported to answer. Worse still, several of these questions
appear more or less unanswerable using the few and sometimes
incompatible analytical tools supplied by the Supreme Court so
far. Examples, discussed in turn below, include (1) whether socalled “facial” regulatory-takings claims are subject to the
compensation prong, (2) whether diversity and supplemental
jurisdiction are available in federal court for prerequisite state
causes of action, (3) whether litigants attempting to raise Fifth
Amendment takings claims in state courts must satisfy the

122 See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 22, at 339–40 (citing Horne as an example of Supreme
Court’s “le[ading] the way in the repositioning of Williamson County as a discretionary,
prudential ripeness doctrine”); Michael W. McConnell, Horne and the Normalization of
Takings Litigation: A Response to Professor Echeverria, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS d10749, 10751 (2013) (stating that if Horne’s remark that “the takings claim
logically must accrue . . . ‘once the government has taken private property without paying
for it’ . . . is true, . . . [then] Williamson County . . . cannot be correct, at least on its own
terms” and that, instead, “its justification must necessarily rest on federalism” (quoting
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062 n.6) (quoting another source) (some internal quotation marks
omitted)).
123 The circuit courts seem to be following suit. See Breemer, supra note 22, at 340–42.
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requirement, and (4) how claim preclusion could operate in this
context, particularly in state courts.
In attempting to justify the Supreme Court’s recent statements
on the subject, this Part explores these questions in light of all
three potential sources of the compensation prong—Article III, the
Fifth Amendment, and prudential considerations. I propose that
resolving the Williamson County ripeness puzzle in favor of a
prudential reading provides the best possible answers for these
questions—and likely for other open questions as well. In this
context, constitutional rules are incapable of adapting to the
context of specific cases. Prudential rules, by contrast, are
substantially more flexible. They are amenable to exceptions, for
instance, where the policy rationales that they were intended to
promote are not implicated or where countervailing concerns
predominate.124 Indeed, the questions outlined above largely turn
on the possibility of exceptions, either actual or functional, to the
compensation prong. Viewing the requirement as prudential
permits a comparison of competing considerations in the context of
specific cases and, ultimately, allows courts to avoid some of the
most surprising and senseless potential implications of alternative
understandings.125
A. JUSTIFYING A PRUDENTIAL COURSE

1. Facial Claims. Courts have long distinguished between
facial and as-applied Fifth Amendment takings claims, as seen in
San Remo Hotel.126 Traditionally, as a Ninth Circuit panel
explained in the takings context, “a facial challenge alleges that
the statute or regulation is unconstitutional in the abstract: that
‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be
valid,’ ”127 whereas an as-applied challenge “asserts that a statute

124 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013 (1992) (“[W]e do not think
it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here.”).
125 For an insightful, recent, and related argument, see generally Breemer, supra note 22,
which explores the distinction between Article-III-based and prudential understandings of
the compensation prong in the contexts of removal and federal-court claim preclusion.
126 See 545 U.S. 346, 346 (2005).
127 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), vacated, 638 F.3d
1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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or regulation ‘infringe[s] constitutional freedoms in the
circumstances of the particular case.’ ”128
It has generally been thought that, Williamson County
notwithstanding, takings plaintiffs remain free to raise facial Fifth
Amendment challenges in federal courts in the first instance.129
But a constitutional reading of the compensation prong may
capture those litigants as well, thereby nullifying any shortcuts
previously provided by attaching the “facial” label to certain
theories of recovery.
As Professor Sterk explains, the federal judiciary has
traditionally classified a number of distinct forms of takings claims
First is the claim that regulations “do[ ] not
as facial.130
substantially advance legitimate government interests.”131 For
years, this constituted the predominant type of facial takings
challenge, including in San Remo Hotel.132 To the surprise of
many observers, however, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
decided just a month before San Remo Hotel, the Supreme Court
declared that previous opinions suggesting the validity of such
claims had been mistaken.133 Other categorical proscriptions
viewed as giving rise to putatively facial regulatory-takings claims
include,134 first, permanent physical occupations of property.135
Second are denials of all economically viable use of subject
property.136 Third are exactions in exchange for development

128 Id. at 1013 (quoting United States v. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S.
561, 565 (1972)).
129 See, e.g., David Zhou, Comment, Rethinking the Facial Takings Claim, 120 YALE L.J.
967, 972–73 (2011).
130 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 265–71.
131 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
132 See 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005) (calling this claim “the heart of [the] complaint”).
133 See 544 U.S. 528, 545–48 (2005) (holding that this type of facial claim “is not a valid
takings test”). Incidentally, the landmark takings case Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005), was also decided that Term. A number of scholars have commented on the
significance of the Court deciding three such monumental takings cases in quick succession.
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, Keynote Address, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings
Law Now Belongs to the States, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2006).
134 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 267–68 (noting Supreme Court’s development of three per
se rules).
135 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982).
136 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (finding such action a
taking unless “the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with”).
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approval that lack an adequate nexus to the justifications
underlying review of the proposal at issue.137
As Professor Sterk explains, however, those groups of claims
diverge from the traditional conception of facial challenges because
they do not necessarily argue that the challenged governmental
action is always and forever unconstitutional.138 For example, it is
not flatly illegal for the government to occupy your property, even
on a permanent basis: it merely may not do so without affording
you just compensation (and meeting the Fifth Amendment’s
public-use requirement). Rather, those categories are classified as
facial because they are not thought to depend on the traditional
primary factor for determining whether an as-applied regulatory
taking has occurred—“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant.”139 In these suits, a court can find a taking and
require the government to compensate the aggrieved property
owner regardless of the magnitude of his economic injury.140
In Yee v. City of Escondido, the Supreme Court seemed
definitively to declare that facial takings claims are not subject to
Williamson County’s ripeness requirements: “While respondent is
correct that a claim that the ordinance effects a regulatory taking
as applied to petitioners’ property would be unripe [under
Williamson County], petitioners mount a facial challenge to the
ordinance.”141 The matter is not so simple, though.
The claim at issue in Yee was of the “substantially advances”
type dispatched by Lingle.142 The Yee Court thus declared that
“[a]s this allegation does not depend on the extent to which
petitioners are deprived of the economic use of their particular
pieces of property or the extent to which these particular
petitioners are compensated, petitioners’ facial challenge is ripe”
under Williamson County.143 The three types of claims that
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). In Stop the Beach, the
Supreme Court listed three types of regulatory-takings claims—the first two above and the
“recharacteriz[ation] as public property what was previously private property.” 560 U.S.
702, 713 (2010) (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163–65
(1980)).
138 Sterk, supra note 92, at 268.
139 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
140 Sterk, supra note 92, at 268.
141 503 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1992).
142 Id. at 534 (“[Petitioners] allege in this Court that the ordinance does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143 Id. (emphasis added).
137
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survived Lingle (permanent physical occupations, denials of all
economically viable use, and attenuated exactions) are “facial” “in
one sense,” Sterk notes, because their “success . . . does not depend
on the economic impact visited on the particular landowner,” thus
satisfying Yee’s first rationale for eschewing initial state-court
adjudication under Williamson County.144 But they would appear
to fail the second rationale—that the claim does “ ‘not depend
on . . . the extent to which the[ ] particular petitioners are
compensated.’ ”145
The question thus stands whether the remaining classes of
“facial” claims are subject to Williamson County’s compensation
prong, requiring routing through state-court systems (and thus
rendering any advantages of labeling such claims facial for
jurisdictional purposes nugatory).146 The circuits have split over
the issue,147 for the most part answering initially in the negative148
and subsequently in the affirmative.149 The Supreme Court has
not addressed the matter directly, and San Remo Hotel sheds little
light on the question, despite suggesting that filing facial takings
claims in federal court in the first instance may be proper.150 That
is because the facial claims at issue there were of the
“substantially advances” type declared ripe by Yee but void by
Lingle, as the Court noted.151
Sterk, supra note 92, at 268.
Id. at 266 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 534).
146 See id. at 269–70.
147 See id. at 269 n.105.
148 See Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 92–100 (2d Cir. 1992); Hall v.
City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n.28 (9th Cir. 1986).
149 See, e.g., Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 91–92 (1st Cir.
2003); Daniel v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 282
F.3d 1196 (2002); McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997);
Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1995); see also S. Pac.
Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1990).
150 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 345–46
(2005) (“Petitioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint—the claim
that the [regulation at issue] was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance
a legitimate state interest—in state court. Petitioners therefore could have raised most of
their facial takings challenges . . . directly in federal court.” (citation omitted)).
151 Id. at 345 n.25 (“In all events, petitioners may no longer advance such claims given our
recent holding that the ‘substantially advances formula is not a valid takings test, and
indeed . . . has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.’ ” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005))). In fact, the Court’s phrasing that “most” (and
therefore assumedly not all) of the hotel owners’ facial challenges “by their nature
requested relief distinct from the provision of ‘just compensation’ ” and could therefore have
been raised “directly in federal court,” id. at 345–46, may support the reading that post144
145
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The answer to this question turns on where the compensation
prong comes from. Because the post-Lingle categories of facial
regulatory-takings claims hinge to some extent on whether the
plaintiff has received just compensation, he simply does not have a
mature claim, jurisdictionally or on the merits, under a reading
grounded in Article III or the Fifth Amendment, respectively, until
he has sought compensation in state court. But given a prudential
understanding of the compensation prong, we are free to take up
Professor Sterk’s suggestion that whether such challenges satisfy
Williamson County “should ultimately be determined by reference
to the purposes of those requirements.”152
Specifically, Sterk explains, “because takings jurisprudence
depends so heavily on state property law, the Supreme Court has
effectively—if implicitly—delegated development of takings
doctrine to the state courts.”153 On the one hand, facial federal
takings claims generally do not trigger that federalism concern
because they do not rest on any intimate understanding of state
law.154 Accordingly, “one may reasonably argue for dispensing
with the [compensation prong] and permitting a landowner to
proceed directly to federal court.”155 On the other hand, Sterk
identifies a number of countervailing concerns that push in the
opposite direction, including the existence of an exception to one of
the rules that requires an examination of background property
law156 and, more generally, the difficulty of accurately
characterizing certain takings claims before engaging in extensive
factual development (and the waste of resources that postponing a
decision on the appropriate forum could accordingly entail).157

Lingle facial claims are indeed subject to the Williamson County compensation
requirement.
152 Sterk, supra note 90, at 270.
153 Id. at 286.
154 See id. at 299 (“Consider, for instance, the rule that permanent physical occupations
always require compensation. Application of the rule requires no investigation of background
state law.
Similarly, the Nollan/Dolan nexus rule requires little understanding of
background state law. Nollan and Dolan require a court to evaluate whether the exaction
demanded by the municipality as a condition for development is reasonably related to the
justification that entitled the municipality to restrict development in the first place. That
evaluation is entirely independent of background state law.” (footnote omitted)).
155 Id.
156 See id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992)).
157 See id. at 299–300.
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Balancing these and other concerns—whether as a categorical
matter or in any given case—may amount to a difficult task. But
my point is that only by characterizing the compensation prong as
prudential in nature can courts perform this task, which may
prove valuable in providing a federal-court backstop for the
consideration of certain takings claims, at all.
2. Diversity and Supplemental Jurisdiction. Two common ways
for plaintiffs who would otherwise find themselves confined to
state court to gain access to the federal judiciary are via the
exercise of diversity jurisdiction158 and the assumption of
supplemental jurisdiction over a state cause of action attached to
another claim cognizable in a federal forum.159 Is it possible for
would-be federal takings litigants functionally (though not
formally) to circumvent Williamson County’s compensation prong
by submitting the required predicate state claims to a federal
tribunal through one of those mechanisms?
One scholar has expressly posed this “difficult question” as it
relates to diversity jurisdiction.160 Of course, in order to avail
themselves of this possibility, plaintiffs would have to meet the
amount-in-controversy and citizenship requirements, but those
obstacles would seem surmountable in a great many cases,
especially those involving corporations. And although federal
courts would be bound by state property law under the Rules of
Decision Act,161 plaintiffs may nevertheless believe that a federal
court would provide a more sympathetic forum—either on account
of the general rationales underlying diversity jurisdiction or
158 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .”).
159 See generally id. § 1367(a) (“Except as . . . expressly provided otherwise by [later
provisions of this statute or another], in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.”).
160 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1868–70 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction should not
be exercised in this context).
161 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State.”).
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because some may think that federal judges are more willing to
vindicate private-property rights than are their state
counterparts.162
As a number of cases reflect, whether a federal court’s exercise
of diversity jurisdiction over the initial claims required by
Williamson County runs afoul of the spirit of the compensation
prong remains uncertain.163 Given that such claims do indeed
press the required state causes of action, the answer may appear
to be an obvious “no.” But allowing plaintiffs to evade Williamson
County in this manner could undercut the state-protective
concerns articulated in San Remo Hotel to a significant degree,
subtracting what might amount to a great many local land-use
disputes from the dockets of the reportedly more competent state
courts.164
Similar issues attend the prospect of a federal court exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the state causes of action required
by Williamson County in conjunction with sufficiently related
claims with independent bases for federal jurisdiction.165
Consider, for instance, that a clever plaintiff could attempt to
append a state compensation claim to a facial federal takings
claim (assuming that the latter can be brought in federal court in
the first instance, as discussed above).
Any preclusive
consequences caused by deciding the state cause of action prior to
an as-applied federal claim would be generated by the federal
court where the plaintiff wanted to litigate in the first place. Like
with respect to diversity jurisdiction, therefore, the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the class of state claims required by
Williamson County would come at the cost of the state-court
expertise that San Remo Hotel regarded as so important.
Turning to the puzzle we hope to solve here, a constitutional
reading of the compensation prong would appear to admit of no
162 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1869 (suggesting that federal judges may be more
willing to protect private-property rights for ideological reasons).
163 Compare, e.g., SK Fin. SA v. La Plata Cnty., 126 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that it does not), with CBS Outdoor Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 06-2428
(HAA), 2007 WL 2509633, at *23 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) (declining to decide issue where
diversity was improperly pleaded for other reasons).
164 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1869–70.
165 Cf. id. at 1870 n.317 (citing Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing supplemental state inverse-condemnation claims where appended to unripe
federal takings claim); CBS Outdoor, 2007 WL 2509633, at *23 (holding supplemental
jurisdiction over regulatory-takings claims improper after dismissal of diversity claims)).
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preference as to where the predicate state suits required by
Williamson County are heard. Under an Article-III-based or FifthAmendment-based understanding of the compensation prong,
federal courts should be able to exercise diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction over those suits whenever the statutory
requirements for doing so have been satisfied, paying little or no
mind to the state-respecting sentiments expressed by San Remo
Hotel. A prudential understanding of the requirement, in contrast,
provides a more nuanced range of options for courts to consider.
The exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the initial state
claims required by Williamson County presents, in a sense, the
trickiest issue examined here. On the one hand, the entire point of
forcing plaintiffs into state court, on a prudential view of the
compensation prong, is to allow the supposedly better-suited state
judiciary to take the first pass at disputes intimately intertwined
with local land-use law. That objective falls flat where such claims
are heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, despite the
fact that state property law still governs. On the other hand, our
judicial system has long accorded great respect to the justifications
undergirding diversity jurisdiction, and litigants are traditionally
not required to prove an actual need for the protections that such
jurisdiction provides.166 To the extent that certain subject areas
could be carved out of the scope of diversity jurisdiction, the state
causes of action required by Williamson County would be plausible
candidates. But, more realistically, such claims appear fully open
to federal-court adjudication.
A prudential view of the
compensation prong perhaps renders abstention or certification to
state high courts appropriate alternatives for federal courts to
consider in some cases. But how frequently federal courts can
properly invoke abstention doctrines when confronted with run-ofthe-mill takings claims is itself a hotly contested issue.167
166 See, e.g., Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The courts
should not use our own judgments about when the purposes of diversity jurisdiction are
met . . . .”); Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharm. Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 392, 396
(5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e may not bar a plaintiff . . . from access to the federal courts because
we conclude that he is unlikely to encounter any bias in state court . . . .”).
167 Compare, e.g., Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.
1998) (“[E]ven in cases involving state land use issues, a district court must not decline
jurisdiction where its exercise ‘would . . . not require the District Court to guess at the
resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law.’ ” (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959))), on remand from 522 U.S. 156 (1997), with
Pomponio v. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Over
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The possibility that federal courts could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims mandated by Williamson
County presents a similar mix of concerns but ultimately appears
amenable to a simpler solution. Federal courts have a strong
interest in adjudicating disputes that implicate federal rights in
some fundamental way, both in the first instance and as unified
sets. Like with respect to diversity, however, granting the
predicate state suits required by the compensation prong easy
access to federal court may undermine the rule’s federalism-based
justifications to a considerable extent. It is significant, therefore,
that (unlike with respect to diversity) federal courts have fairly
broad discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.168
Hence, a prudential understanding of the compensation prong may
point in favor of permitting the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over Williamson County’s required state claims only
occasionally, while relegating the majority to state court. In
particular, in order to prevent the sort of circumvention mentioned
previously, supplemental jurisdiction would be most appropriate
where the state claims in question interconnect with issues
implicating federal rights that are neither limited to nor
dominated by takings claims.
3. State-Court Litigants. San Remo Hotel recognized and
accepted the fact that its holding might prevent a large proportion
of Fifth Amendment litigants from ever reaching federal court.169

frequent objections and challenges and in practically every instance, we have held that,
absent unusual circumstances, a district court should abstain . . . from exercising its
jurisdiction in cases arising solely out of state or local zoning or land use law, despite
attempts to disguise the issues as federal claims.”), overruled on other grounds by
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728–31 (1996).
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2)
the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdictions, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.”).
169 To be clear, as suggested with respect to Horne, it is generally assumed that plaintiffs
challenging a putative taking by the federal government (as opposed to a state or local
entity) can bring suit under the Fifth Amendment in the first instance in the Court of
Federal Claims. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 113, at 783. But see McConnell, supra note 122,
at 10750–51 (“It makes no sense to say that the constitutional violation does not occur until
after the party seeks and is denied compensation in the Court of Federal Claims, because
the claimant cannot sue under the Tucker Act except for a constitutional violation, which
must have occurred before he can sue. Instead, the takings claim logically must accrue, as
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But the Court assumed—clearly in dictum—that parties could
raise their federal takings claims in state systems, unhampered by
Williamson County. Specifically, the majority stated that it
“reject[ed] petitioners’ contention that Williamson County
prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their [as-applied] federal
claims in state courts.”170 State courts are not necessarily barred
from “hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the
alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth
Amendment,” Justice Stevens stated, concluding that a contrary
determination would require property owners to “ ‘resort to
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.’ ”171
But how, doctrinally, could that be so? Is it not the case that, as
one scholar has put it, “[t]he federal takings claim simply does not
exist before the state inverse condemnation claim is resolved”?172
For the reasons explained below, it appears that if the Williamson
County compensation prong were considered constitutional in
nature (again, as springing from either Article III or the Fifth
Amendment), it would likely apply to all or many state-court
plaintiffs in the same manner as it applies to federal-court
plaintiffs—making Fifth Amendment claims unfit for even state
courts prior to a separate suit seeking just compensation.
To understand why this is so with respect to an Article-IIIbased understanding of the compensation prong, we must first ask
whether and how justiciability doctrines control the adjudication of
federal causes of action heard under concurrent jurisdiction in
state courts.173 While state justiciability law is generally thought
to predominate even where the claim is federal, that proposition

the Horne Court explained, ‘once the government has taken private property without paying
for it.’ ” (quoting 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013))).
170 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005).
171 Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986)).
Incidentally, it seems somewhat ironic for the majority to lament forcing plaintiffs to “resort
to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures” when that is precisely what the
petitioners, id. at 338, and the separate opinion, id. at 350–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment), argued that the majority’s result did.
172 Kovacs, supra note 89, at 18.
173 Litigants bringing federal takings claims in state court will generally use § 1983 as a
vehicle. The Supreme Court recognized concurrent state jurisdiction over such claims in
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
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has generated significant controversy,174 with several scholars
arguing—on the strength of Article III and/or the Supremacy
Clause—that state jurisdiction over federal causes of action cannot
be broader than the scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction as shaped by federal justiciability principles.175 The
question whether federal law (including Williamson County)
controls of its own force, at least at the margins, thus remains
subject to debate.
Even if state justiciability law governs, a range of approaches
would be possible. First, a state could choose to borrow federal
justiciability doctrine as the measure of its own.176 Second, a
state’s justiciability requirements could equal or exceed those set
by federal law, shutting out the same or a broader range of
plaintiffs.177 Or, finally, state justiciability law could be more
lenient than its federal counterpart, affording a greater number of
litigants their day in court.178 Only in the last scenario would it be
possible that a state court could assume jurisdiction over a federal
takings claim that did not satisfy Williamson County.
Alternatively, the compensation prong could be a FifthAmendment-based ripeness requirement. In essence, it could
articulate a necessary element of a claim that the Takings Clause
See Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2011)
(“One of the principal tensions in federal jurisdiction is between the U.S. Supreme Court’s
role as guardian of federal supremacy and the independent authority of state courts to
adjudicate federal substantive rights without having to heed federal jurisdictional
constraints.”).
175 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 282–84 (1990); Paul J. Katz,
Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and the
Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1340–49 (2005).
176 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement
of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1008 (2001)
(“Surely some states follow Article III standing . . . .”).
177 See, e.g., id. at 1006 (noting that state “courts customarily decline to rule on questions
of law absent something like a case or controversy” (citing Brown Mech. Contractors v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1983); Estes v. Walters, 601 S.W.2d 252 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1980); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980))); Maria
Farinella, Comment, The Clean Air Act of 1990: Title V’s Operating Permit Provision for
Citizen Access to State Court Judicial Review, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 67, 84–87 (1994)
(recounting Virginia legislature’s imposition of standing requirements more restrictive than
those of Article III on certain environmental plaintiffs).
178 See, e.g., Me. Ass’n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm’r, 876 F.2d 1051, 1054
(1st Cir. 1989) (stating that Maine’s standing law is more liberal than federal standing law);
Langford v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 822, 833 n.6 (Cal. 1987) (“California’s [standing]
requirements are less stringent than those imposed by federal law.”).
174
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has been violated: without a denial of just compensation in state
court, the plaintiff does not have a full-fledged cause of action.
Here there is little room for disputing that state as well as federal
courts would be constitutionally disempowered from entertaining
federal regulatory-takings claims absent pursuit of a predicate
state cause of action. If the Supreme Court has declared certain
procedures mandated by the very text of the Fifth Amendment,
inferior courts may not disagree. While states are free to enshrine
greater protections for private-property rights in their own
constitutions, they cannot formulate their own elements for federal
Fifth Amendment claims—nor may they disregard elements
established by the Supreme Court.
How would viewing the compensation prong as prudential
change the scenario? The prudential purpose of the rule, as stated
in San Remo Hotel, is to provide state courts a first pass at takings
challenges prior to their potential adjudication in federal court.
This rationale does not justify requiring plaintiffs who wish (or
are, as a consequence of San Remo Hotel, effectively required) to
litigate both their federal and state takings claims in state court to
pursue two distinct sets of claims. If such a litigant asserts the
state cause of action mandated by the compensation prong
simultaneously with her ultimate Fifth Amendment claim, the
policy principles expressed in San Remo Hotel are still obtained, as
state courts will continue to “bear primary responsibility for
policing land-use regulations.”179 And the savings to judicial and
litigant resources nearly go without saying.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to have endorsed this
point in his San Remo Hotel concurrence, albeit very briefly. In a
footnote responding to the majority’s assertion that Williamson
County does not require state litigants to proceed in piecemeal
fashion, Rehnquist stated that plaintiffs would be permitted to
raise federal takings claims simultaneously with state causes of
action only if Williamson County’s compensation prong “is merely
a prudential rule, and not a constitutional mandate”—a question
he criticized the majority for “conspicuously le[aving] open.”180
4. Claim Preclusion. San Remo Hotel focused exclusively on
issue preclusion (or “collateral estoppel,” in common-law
Sterk, supra note 92, at 286.
545 U.S. 323, 351–52 n.2 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see
supra text accompanying note 87.
179
180
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speak)181—the rule that “once a court has decided an issue of fact
or law necessary to its judgment, that decision . . . preclude[s]
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action
involving a party to the first case.”182 Several perceptive scholars,
however, have noted that San Remo Hotel’s reasoning, with its
categorical hostility to judicially crafted exceptions to the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, must extend to the blunter instrument
of claim preclusion (or “res judicata”) as well,183 given that intersystem claim-preclusion principles also derive from § 1738.184
Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an
action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating
issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”185
As an initial matter, it is worth exploring whether the
distinction between claim and issue preclusion is one without a
difference in this context. That is, would issue preclusion by itself
effectively foreclose later federal-court adjudication of Fifth
Amendment takings claims, or would there still be room left for
claim preclusion to operate?
Professor Sterk argues the latter position.186 He begins by
demonstrating that the issue-preclusive effects of a state-court
denial of just compensation will generally require outright
dismissal of subsequent federal takings claims only where issues
of “ultimate fact”—that is, the application of law to fact—are
sufficiently similar in the state and federal proceedings.187 That
condition obviously obtained in San Remo Hotel itself, where the
181 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327 n.1 (“[O]ur grant of certiorari was limited exclusively
to [a] question [concerning] issue preclusion . . . .”).
182 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
183 See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 22, at 328–32; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 775; Kovacs,
supra note 89, at 14; Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1841; Sterk, supra note 92, at 276–83.
184 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
185 Id. at 94.
186 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 271–83.
187 Issue-preclusion doctrine generally applies to
three types of determinations:
evidentiary fact, law, and “ultimate fact.” Id. at 273 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982)). As Sterk explains,
Issue preclusion presents the greatest threat to federal takings claims
when the state court has made a determination of ultimate fact, for
instance, a determination that the fee imposed on the hotel’s owner was
reasonably related to the number of units designated for conversion. When
a determination of ultimate fact is critical—as it was in San Remo—for
both the state and the federal takings claim, issue preclusion doctrine could
require . . . outright dismissal of the federal takings claim.
Id. at 274.
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California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution’s
takings provision as “congruent” with its federal counterpart.188
As Sterk explains, however, many state takings causes of action
are resolved on state-specific grounds that do not require courts to
consider issues of ultimate fact paralleling Fifth Amendment
analysis.189 “As a result, issue preclusion doctrine . . . would leave
many federal takings claims open to federal litigation even after
the state courts have finally rejected state takings claims.”190
Nevertheless, Sterk contends, “the gaps left open by issue
preclusion doctrine will quickly be closed by claim preclusion
principles.”191 Because the measure of preclusion under § 1738 is
the law of the judgment-rendering state, the question becomes
whether state preclusion rules tolerate bifurcated (or “split,” as the
terminology goes) actions: first, an inverse-condemnation or other
claim seeking compensation under state law and, second, a federal
takings claim.192 While the contours of preclusion law may vary
from state to state, the majority standard would seem to be the
“transactional” test outlined in § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, which provides that claim preclusion extinguishes “all
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the [initial] action arose.”193 The
Restatement’s commentary explains that “the concept of a
transaction is here used in [a] broad sense” as “connot[ing] a
natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.”194
Federal takings claims and the state predicates required by
Williamson County will obviously arise out of a common nucleus of
operative facts, rendering the latter potentially preclusive of the
former in states that subscribe to the majority approach.
Consequently, Sterk concludes, claim preclusion should keep more
takings challenges out of federal court than would the issue188 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 332 (2005)
(quoting 41 P.3d 87, 100–01 (Cal. 2002)).
189 As examples, Sterk mentions a New York doctrine barring challenges to restrictions in
place at the time the relevant property was purchased by the challenger, as well as a New
Jersey principle holding that no taking has occurred where the application of a regulation to
the plaintiff’s property is invalidated for arbitrariness. Sterk, supra note 92, at 275–76.
190 Id. at 254.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 281.
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).
194 Id. § 24 cmt. b.
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preclusion principles on which San Remo Hotel relied.195 The rule
articulated there is accordingly broader than it initially appears.
The ominous result, says Sterk: “a nearly insurmountable obstacle
for claimants seeking federal court litigation of federal takings
claims.”196
The foregoing is by now relatively uncontroversial with respect
to federal courts. Further issues concerning whether and how
claim preclusion ought to operate in state systems confronted with
federal regulatory-takings claims, however, have gone largely
unexamined. In particular, if state litigants are subject to the
compensation prong, such that they must seek payment under
state causes of action in an initial round of litigation before
pressing their federal claims in a subsequent round, how might
claim preclusion operate on the second suit? If claim preclusion
could block assertion of follow-up Fifth Amendment claims in both
state and federal court, could it be that some “[f]ederal takings
claims . . . go from green to rotten without ever being ripe”?197
Because the measure of inter-system preclusion under § 1738 is
the intra-system preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state,
claim-preclusion principles ought to operate against federal
takings challenges brought subsequent to the claims mandated by
Williamson County in state courts to the same extent as in federal
courts. And therein lies the little-noticed rub—perhaps one of the
ultimate jurisprudential Catch-22s: bifurcation could be
simultaneously required and verboten in both federal and state
systems for the reasons described above.198
In assessing this hypothesis, two qualifications to the general
principles of claim preclusion warrant scrutiny. For the sake of
195 Moreover, a state court cannot attempt to soften this sort of blow by stating that its
judgments should have less preclusive effect in federal courts. See Thomas v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 285–86 (1980); see also Sterk, supra note 92, at 282.
196 Sterk, supra note 92, at 276–77. That possibility has been labeled “certiorari only”
because of the prospect that litigating a federal takings claim from a state system up to the
U.S. Supreme Court may be the only avenue to federal review. Lindberg, supra note 90, at
1841.
197 Martinez & Martinez, supra note 80, at 451 (stating hypothetical but rejecting it as
incorrect interpretation of precedent).
198 Alternate, minority standards may or may not capture such closely related claims, but
it stands to reason that many would. Moreover, under general “reverse-Erie” principles, so
long as states apply procedural rules (such as the law of claim preclusion) evenhandedly
between state and federal causes of action, the fact that an entire class of federal claims
may be barred from state courts does not present any particular federalism concern. See
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 141–46 (1988).
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simplicity, I discuss these issues as they are framed in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. First, § 26(1)(c) provides that
if “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case
or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action
because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
courts,” § 24’s general rule “does not apply to extinguish the
Accordingly, if Williamson County’s compensation
claim.”199
requirement could be deemed to articulate a subject-matterjurisdiction rule, claim preclusion might not bar the litigation of a
federal takings challenge after the litigation of a prerequisite state
cause of action.200 As discussed above, if the requirement arises
from the Constitution in the first place, it could fairly be
considered “jurisdictional” only if the specific source were Article
III rather than the Fifth Amendment.201 The question, then,
becomes whether Article III justiciability doctrines, including
ripeness rules, are limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction.
Justiciability need not be treated as an aspect of subject-matter
jurisdiction.202 Both inquiries can be described as “jurisdictional”
because they relate to whether a given tribunal has the authority
to adjudicate a given dispute. But whereas justiciability doctrines
“define the institutional role of the . . . judiciary with respect
to . . . the other branches of . . . government” and thus “preserve
the ideal of separation of powers,”203 subject-matter jurisdiction
defines the institutional roles of various courts within the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
In full, § 26(1)(c) applies to claims that were initially foreclosed by “the limitations on
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain
multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action.” Id.
(emphasis added). The comments make clear that the latter portion denotes the possible
persistence of “formal inhibitions imposed by the historical division between ‘law’ and
‘equity,’ or the forms of action, or related procedural modes.” Id. at cmt. c(2). All that
remains is the catch-all exception for situations in which a plaintiff can “clearly and
convincingly” demonstrate that “the policies favoring preclusion of a second action are
overcome for an extraordinary reason, such as the apparent invalidity of a continuing
restraint or condition having a vital relation to personal liberty or the failure of the prior
litigation to yield a coherent disposition of the controversy.” Id. § 26(1)(f).
201 See supra Part III.B.2.
202 See Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 526–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“That a plaintiff makes a claim that is not justiciable because committed to
executive discretion does not mean the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his case,
as the opinion of the court helps to clarify. Upon a proper motion, a court should dismiss
the case for failure to state a claim. . . . [T]his court has been careful to distinguish between
the two concepts.”).
203 Lees, supra note 59, at 1481, 1488.
199
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judiciary, federal or state, vis-à-vis each other.204 Justiciability
can thus be thought of as a threshold concern with whether courts
in general are equipped to resolve a dispute in the abstract,205
whereas subject-matter jurisdiction can be viewed as a logically
subsequent inquiry into whether a particular court can actually do
so.206
But the matter is by no means clear-cut. Courts often treat
justiciability as part and parcel of subject-matter jurisdiction,207
and some states may actually define subject-matter jurisdiction to
include issues traditionally seen as questions of justiciability.208
Moreover, one could argue that this distinction is overly
formalistic—particularly given the apparent functional motivation
of § 26(1)(c), to dilute the strong medicine of claim preclusion
where the first court simply had no authority to hear the second
claim.209

See id.; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982). Under
federal law, the concepts of justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction can be seen as
stemming from textually distinct sources, too. Constitutional justiciability doctrines derive
from Article III’s limitation of “[t]he judicial power” to “cases” and “controversies.” Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968); U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. By contrast, subject-matter
jurisdiction derives from the nine specific categories—or subject matters—of cases and
controversies listed in Article III, as well as from various federal statutes further delimiting
the jurisdiction of federal courts. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 5.1.
205 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “justiciability” as “[t]he
quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court”); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 62, § 3529 (“Concepts of justiciability have been developed to identify
appropriate occasions for judicial action.”).
206 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 205, at 931 (defining “subject-matter
jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things”).
207 See, e.g., Naso v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1566, 1567 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (“A
federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to express a legal opinion in an action
which lacks a justiciable case or controversy.”). Practically, this may occur in part because of
the (arguably artificially) limited nature of the categories of so-called “jurisdictional” defects
for challenging a complaint by motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Oryszak, 576 F.3d at 526–27
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (contending that non-justiciable claims should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim”).
208 See, e.g., State v. 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999) (“ ‘Standing is
a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting Barshop v. Medina Cnty.
Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1996))).
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. c (1982) (referring to “formal
barriers in the way of a litigant’s presenting to a court in one action the entire claim” but
then proceeding to specify the two sources of such barriers discussed above).
204
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The second potentially relevant qualification may harken back
to the common conception of claim preclusion as extending to
claims that were or “could have been” raised in the initial suit,
depending on the meaning of that phrase.210 Section 20(2) of the
Restatement provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] valid and final
personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the
prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a
precondition to suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff
instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition has
been satisfied.”211 By its terms, § 20(2) applies only to a plaintiff
who has suffered a “final personal judgment for the defendant,”
not to one who did not attempt to assert the later claim in the first
instance. This raises the somewhat odd possibility that a plaintiff
who has lost her Fifth Amendment claim may be better off than
one who has failed to litigate it at all.212
In any event, what really matters is the practical question
whether there is a meaningful risk that courts would take the
approach posited as possible here. In light of at least one state
high-court decision, the answer seems to be “yes.”
The plaintiff in Hallco Texas, Inc. v. McMullen County213
began by attempting to raise a Fifth Amendment regulatorytakings claim in the federal system. The district court dismissed
the case without prejudice for failure to satisfy the compensation
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (1982).
212 Perhaps someone would argue that a notice function could be served by that
possibility. It is also worth noting that a broad reading of § 20(2) may conflict with the
plain text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which provides that “[u]nless the
dismissal order states otherwise, . . . any dismissal . . . except one for lack of
jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). The
Reporter’s Note to § 202(2) recognized that those provisions are in tension but notes that
in 1961, “the Supreme Court stated that a dismissal for ‘failure of the plaintiff to satisfy a
precondition’ was . . . a dismissal for lack of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of [Rule
41(b)].” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) Reporter’s Note (1982) (quoting
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284–88 (1961)). Costello, however, has been subject
to a great deal of criticism and a number of carve-outs. See, e.g., 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 106, § 4437 (“[Costello’s] method of manipulating Rule 41(b) is unsatisfactory on
several counts [and] should be avoided in reasoning about any particular question.”). It also
seems inconsistent with the Court’s recent efforts “[t]o ward off profligate use of the term
‘jurisdiction.’ ” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). Perhaps,
therefore, § 20(2) should carry the most force where the relevant precondition is truly
jurisdictional. Then again, we ought to be wary about allowing the tail of a modern rule to
wag the dog of what may be a long common-law tradition.
213 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006).
210
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prong.214 The plaintiff, a corporation, then proceeded to state
court, where it lost a facial state regulatory-takings challenge. It
then again filed suit in state court, this time asserting as-applied
state and federal takings claims.215 The Supreme Court of Texas
noted that “[w]e apply the transactional approach to res judicata”
and held that the pending state claim was precluded by the first
state case.216 It then extended that holding to the federal claim by
expressly expanding San Remo Hotel to claim preclusion.217 And
although the court did not explicitly state whether the
compensation prong applied in the state system, it noted and
expressed no disagreement with the lower court’s assumption that
the federal claim “was not ripe at the time [the plaintiff] filed [its]
first [state] suit.”218
Again, what difference would viewing the compensation prong
as prudential in nature make? As it turns out, the problem posed
by claim preclusion where a plaintiff attempts to sue seriatim
would likely remain unchanged by a prudential understanding.
But, as discussed above, the antecedent requirement that state
litigants must satisfy the compensation prong, and therefore
attempt multiple rounds of litigation in the first place, could be
lifted. Accordingly, the most senseless possible consequences of
claim preclusion in state systems—that bifurcation could be both
mandatory and forbidden—could be avoided via a prudential
solution to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle. The same, of
course, goes for federal courts, although because the consequences
of claim preclusion are not as bleak in that context (assuming that
state forums remain open to federal takings claims), the
arguments for softening the dictates of the compensation prong
may be less convincing.
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 54–55.
216 Id. at 58–60.
217 Id. at 61–62. One could argue that the Hallco court was focused more closely on the
takings prong of Williamson County, which may have been satisfied at the time of the
initial state filing. But that seems overly simplistic given that the court plainly discussed
both the takings and compensation requirements and repeatedly recognized that the federal
court had rested its dismissal on the latter.
218 Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 94 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002), discussed
in 221 S.W.3d at 56. Among other colorful quotes, the dissent stated that “[r]ipening a
regulatory-takings claim [has] become[ ] a costly game of ‘Mother, May I’, in which the
landowner is allowed to take only small steps forward and backwards until exhausted.” 221
S.W.3d at 63 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
214
215
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B. CONSIDERING A COUPLE OF COUNTERARGUMENTS

Two potential, not-yet-discussed counterarguments to the
conclusion that the mystery surrounding the nature of the
compensation prong should be resolved in favor of a prudential
solution come to mind. The first is textual and relates to the
argument as a general matter; the second is structural and relates
to the special concern of closing all courthouse doors in the face of
some federal takings claimants.
1. Due-Process Parallels. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause is worded in a strikingly similar manner to its next-door
neighbor, the Due Process Clause.
“No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”
commands the Due Process Clause; “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation,” echoes the
Takings Clause.219 Each can be read as first stating a substantive
proscription followed by a (logically precedent) procedural
prescription. So, from a textualist perspective, it would perhaps be
appealing to set up parallel analytical frameworks for evaluating
claims under the two provisions.
For this reason, the Supreme Court stated in Williamson County,
“[t]he recognition that a property owner has not suffered a violation
of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining just compensation is analogous
to the Court’s holding in Parratt v. Taylor.”220 Parratt, as described
in Williamson County, ruled that “a person deprived of property
through a random and unauthorized act by a state employee does
not state a claim under the Due Process Clause merely by alleging
the deprivation of property”; rather, he must also show that the
state affirmatively denied him whatever process he was due.221 The
counterargument, therefore, is that treating the compensation
prong as merely prudential destroys this parallelism because the
denial of just compensation would not necessarily be viewed as part
and parcel of the constitutional violation (as it is in the FifthAmendment-based formulation).

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (describing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1985)).
221 Id. (permitting due process to occur “postdeprivation”).
219
220
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Two rejoinders suggest themselves.
First, perhaps the
substantive-proscription/procedural-prescription view is itself
faulty. While that description clearly fits the Due Process Clause,
the Takings Clause is more amenable to being read as substantive
through and through. That is, the Takings Clause can be—and, it
appears, long was222—understood as enshrining a right not to have
your property appropriated unless the government pays for it—
regardless of the procedural protections provided.
That
observation supports the second, more functionalist rejoinder.
Whereas the Parratt rule rests on a compelling policy foundation,
there exists no rationale of comparable strength for dividing the
time dimension over which a regulatory-takings injury occurs by
characterizing the burdening of property as a separate event from
the denial of just compensation. The Supreme Court undermined
its reliance on Parratt by essentially admitting as much in a
Williamson County footnote,223 and others have made the point in
various contexts.224
Basically, Parratt permits post-deprivation process to suffice
only where government action is “random and unauthorized.”225
Williamson County, in contrast, permits post-deprivation process
to suffice in all situations.226 There is a strong justification for
tolerating that sort of process in the former context. As the Court

See Hawley, supra note 22, at 252–54.
“The analogy to Parratt is imperfect because Parratt does not extend to
situations . . . in which the deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established
state policy or procedure, and the State could provide predeprivation process.” Williamson
County, 473 U.S. at 195–96 n.14. But the ensuing distinction is question-begging in light of
the Court’s evident desire to interpret the two clauses in tandem: “Unlike the Due Process
Clause, however, the Just Compensation Clause has never been held to require pretaking
process or compensation. Nor has the Court ever recognized any interest served by
pretaking compensation that could not be equally well served by post-taking compensation.”
Id. (citation omitted).
224 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 349 n.1
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“In creating the [compensation prong],
the Court [in Williamson County] . . . analogized to . . . Parratt v. Taylor. As several of
petitioners’ amici in this case have urged, th[at] case[ ] provided limited support for
the . . . requirement.” (citations omitted)); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson
County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion
Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe
Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 229–30 (2003); Keller, supra note 88, at
218 (“Parratt should not have been extended to takings claims because the predicate for
invoking Parratt . . . is never involved in regulatory takings claims.”).
225 451 U.S. at 541.
226 473 U.S. at 195–96 n.14.
222
223
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stated in Parratt, “[i]n such a case, . . . the State cannot predict
precisely when the loss will occur,” rendering it “not only
impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing
before the deprivation.”227 No similar justification supports the
compensation prong, as regulatory takings are never random and
unauthorized; nor are they unforeseeable in light of the fact that
no constitutional violation can occur absent quasi-exhaustion of
administrative remedies per Williamson County’s takings prong.228
2. Unreviewable Constitutional Claims. With respect to the
particular worry that a constitutional reading of the compensation
prong could render some Fifth Amendment claims unfit for
adjudication in both state and federal judicial systems by virtue of
claim preclusion (or other doctrinal wrinkles229), one might point
out that there are plenty of potential constitutional claims that
cannot be vindicated in courts of law. Among other examples in
his dissent in Webster v. Doe,230 Justice Scalia pointed to claims
butting up against the requirement that “[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members.”231 The response to this argument should be that
litigating the kinds of claims barred from courts altogether would
generally run the risk of compromising critical structural
principles of separation of powers or, perhaps, federalism.232
Those concerns simply are not in play when it comes to disabling
state courts from deciding federal regulatory-takings claims,
especially given the well-established principle that such courts are
perfectly capable of doing so in conformity to federal law.233
Moreover, with the exception of the highly idiosyncratic and
vague Ninth Amendment,234 I am unaware of any portion of the

451 U.S. at 541.
Incidentally, the Court has never explained why the administrative procedures
contemplated by the takings prong are insufficient for deciding the payment question and,
consequently, why a taking itself and the denial of just compensation associated with that
taking should be treated as temporally distinct elements of a Fifth Amendment claim.
229 With respect to removal from state to federal court, see Breemer, supra note 22, at
332–37.
230 486 U.S. 592, 612–13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting.
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
232 486 U.S. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233 See Fein, supra note 113, at 786–87 (explaining assumption and collecting arguments
on both sides).
234 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any
227
228
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Bill of Rights that is regarded as wholly unfit for adjudicative
enforcement. There is little reason to believe that the Takings
Clause should be an outlier among these basic liberties—or that
the Supreme Court meant to make it one.235 Indeed, the Court has
made clear in another context that there is “no reason why” that
provision, “as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the
status of a poor relation.”236
V. CONCLUSION
The expressions that various observers have conjured to
describe this complex corner of the law would be utterly comical if
they were not so incisive. Takings doctrine is a “crazy-quilt
pattern,” a “muddle,” a “welter of confusing and apparently
incompatible results,” and a “farrago of fumblings which have
suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories,” some
commentators have said; the area is “liberally salted with
paradox,” another has remarked.237 More particularly, the socalled “Williamson County compensation prong”—a rule that
generally forces plaintiffs pursuing Fifth Amendment regulatorytakings challenges first to seek compensation in state court—has
been called “deceptive, inherently nonsensical, draconian, and a
Kafkaesque maze, among other unflattering things.”238
Seeking a modest measure of order in the midst of all this
chaos, this Article has proposed a solution to the “ripeness puzzle”
underlying the compensation prong. For decades, judges and
scholars have questioned whether this rule should be
one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might
be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.”).
235 Cf. J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s
Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB.
LAW. 615, 626 (2009) (“ ‘[T]he barring of the federal courthouse door to takings litigants
seems an unanticipated effect of Williamson County . . . .’ ” (quoting DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky,
381 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2004))); Fein, supra note 113, at 784 (“I do not mean to suggest
that Justices intended something other than what they wrote in Williamson County; more
likely they simply failed to foresee the complex doctrinal and jurisdictional implications
that the new rule would create.”).
236 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (making point that so-called “business
regulations” are not immune from constitutional scrutiny in any of those areas).
237 Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 n.2 (1993) (collecting “characteristic
characterizations of takings doctrine”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238 Fein, supra note 113, at 773 (collecting descriptions) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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characterized as stemming from the Constitution itself—either
from Article III or the Fifth Amendment—or simply from the
judiciary’s notions of prudent policy. While the Supreme Court
has recently commented on the matter, its statements endorsing a
prudential framing of the requirement have provided only a
partial and largely unexplained solution.
This Article has
attempted to expand on and justify those remarks in order to
elucidate an analytically sturdier understanding of the
compensation prong.
Specifically, I have examined the Williamson County ripeness
puzzle through the lens of several vexing questions, arguing that
they are best accessed through and answered by a prudential
solution. Viewing the compensation prong as prudential in nature
demonstrates why so-called “facial” federal takings challenges
have been seen as appropriately laying claim to a federal forum in
the first instance and allows for the continuation of this tradition
in the manner most respectful of the state-regarding concerns
expressed in San Remo Hotel. A prudential view also allows
courts to consider the propriety of exercising supplemental—and,
to a lesser extent, diversity—jurisdiction over the predicate state
claims required by the compensation prong on a case-by-case basis
with pertinent federalism principles in mind.
Moreover, a constitutional reading of the compensation prong
could bind state-court claimants just as if they were in federal
court. They would therefore be required to attempt to engage in
two rounds of litigation in order to pursue a Fifth Amendment
regulatory-takings challenge—an initial state compensation claim
followed by the federal claim, both in state court. And, also just as
in the federal-court system, claim-preclusion principles could kick
in to bar the latter round of state litigation from actually
occurring, thereby rendering some Fifth Amendment claims
effectively forum-less. A prudential solution to the ripeness puzzle
could eliminate the unintended potential consequences of wasting
resources and closing essentially all courthouse doors in the face of
some would-be Fifth Amendment litigants.
Much more work remains to be done in this murky area.
Perhaps for now, though, we have moved one step closer to better
understanding—and even beginning to solve—the Williamson
County ripeness puzzle.

